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Is Mozambique’s elite moving  
from corruption to development? 
 
By Joseph Hanlon and Marcelo Mosse 
 
Mozambique’s elite has responded to five decades of rapid change and international 
pressure by staying united and steering a course that tried to balance the conflicting 
pressures of national development, self-interest, and the demands of the international 
community. This paper argues that after a period of donor-supported corruption, crude rent-
seeking and unsuccessful Washington Consensus policies, the elite has shifted into using 
the state to promote the creation of business groups that could be large enough and 
dynamic enough to follow a development model with some similarities to the Asian Tigers, 
industrial development in Latin America, or Volkskapitalisme in apartheid South Africa. 
 
Responding to five decades of rapid change and international pressure while maintaining unity and 
a nationalist development agenda is no small victory in itself. And this has created a set of specific 
conditions which has, in turn, shaped the Mozambican elite and its development strategy. Three 
factors have influenced Mozambique’s recent history: 
• First, it is unusual in that the single liberation movement Frelimo has stayed united and is now 
the predominant political party, winning all multi-party elections. The party has never become 
personalised (as with Robert Mugabe in neighbouring Zimbabwe), and there have been peaceful 
handovers of power. There are bitter personal and political conflicts within the party, but it has 
never split and there have been remarkably few defections or expulsions. The present and most 
recent past presidents were liberation war leaders and now head important business groups. Thus 
the new elite of an independent Mozambique has its roots in the independence struggle, while its 
continuous control of the state has allowed the direction of state resources, contracts, licences, etc.  
• Second, Mozambique is a poor, small and peripheral state. Although it will be an important 
mineral-energy exporter, it lacks that fabulous oil wealth of Angola or Nigeria, which means it has 
not been hit by the “resource curse” – there simply isn’t enough money for big corruption.  
• Third, Mozambique’s recent history has been unusually shaped by international forces, 
including the cold war, the aid industry, and neo-liberalism.  
 Thus the leadership has had to juggle three often conflicting priorities: nationalism and 
development, class and self-interest, and overwhelming international pressure.  
 This paper is in five sections. First is an outline of recent Mozambican history. Second, 
thoughts on the shift to capitalism and corruption. Third, consideration of the changing shape of 
Mozambique’s elite capitalism in the first decade of the 21st century. Fourth, a discussion of why 
this new model creates a base for a development model with some similarities to the Asian Tigers 
or Volkskapitalisme in apartheid South Africa. This will also include a discussion on governance 
and challenge some donor thinking on what constitutes corruption. Finally, we will raise a number 
of caveats and questions about whether the Frelimo elite is willing and able to follow the Asian 
model. 
 
History 
 
Mozambique has gone through five distinct periods, each shaped by foreign intervention:1 
 LIBERATION WAR (1965-74): Portugal refused to follow the British or French models of 
decolonisation, and NATO backed Portugal’s attempt to retain its colonies. The Front for the 
Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) was the unique liberation movement, and it gained support 
from both China and the Soviet Union, as well as left parties in Europe. Internal divisions led to 
several killings, including the assassination of the first president, Eduardo Mondlane, in 1969. A 
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shocked Frelimo then took to heart the quote attributed to Benjamin Franklin, the US revolutionary, 
that “we must all hang together, or, assuredly, we will all hang separately,” and has maintained a 
remarkable unity since. Samora Machel was elected president in 1970 and Frelimo began to make 
gains against the Portuguese. A coup in Portugal in 1974 led by a military tired of fighting colonial 
wars opened the way to independence the next year. 
 SOCIALISM (1975-81): With the coup, Portugal stopped the war and Frelimo, as the only 
liberation movement, took power. This was the era of the one-party developmental state in Africa, 
so there was no challenge to Frelimo merging party and state. Under Portuguese colonialism, 
government and the economy were dominated by Portuguese settlers, and the regime had been 
quite brutal, so the majority of fearful settlers fled back to Portugal. Social services (health, 
education, law, funerals) were nationalised but little in the economy. However many businesses 
were abandoned (and often sabotaged as the manger left), so the state, by default, ended up with 
a key and unexpected role in a mixed economy. Inexperienced and often poorly educated 
Mozambicans filled the gaps, and within two years had turned around administrative and economic 
collapse; the economy was growing and there was a rapid expansion of health and education. 
Increasingly influenced by, and supported by, the then Socialist East bloc, Frelimo adopted a 
socialist policy, with the state playing the leading role in a still mixed economy. Five years after 
independence, Frelimo remained immensely popular, both for ending colonial oppression and for 
the expansion of health and education. 
 WAR (1982-92): Ronald Reagan took office as President of the United States in 1981 and 
immediately intensified the cold war. Proxy hot wars between East and West took place in Angola, 
Mozambique and Nicaragua, and the US backed white minority rule (apartheid) in South Africa as 
a bastion against neighbouring “communist” states. An opposition guerrilla movement, Renamo2, 
was created. In an initially unsuccessful attempt to pacify the United States, Mozambique joined 
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in 1984. The war escalated in 1986, with the 
killing of President Samora Machel3 and invasions of two northern provinces. As the war raged, 
Mozambique introduced a World Bank structural adjustment programme, which included a very 
large privatisation programme. Peace was only possible with the end of the cold war, which 
brought the end of apartheid in South Africa. A peace accord was signed in 1992 which recognised 
the legitimacy of the government and the existing constitution, but ensured multi-party elections 
and made Renamo the only serious opposition party. 
 CAPITALISM AND THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS (1993-2001): Renamo failed to displace 
Frelimo as the natural party of government. Joaquim Chissano, who had replaced Samora Machel, 
was elected president in multi-party elections in 1994 and 1999. Whereas the World Bank had 
dominated Mozambican economic policy in the late 1980s, the IMF came to prominence in 1990 
and imposed an extremely harsh structural adjustment programme which included a limit on post-
war reconstruction and limits on health and education spending. The economy had grown under 
the first adjustment programme, during the war, but declined in the post war period and there was 
no peace dividend. The IMF even capped the aid Mozambique could receive. But with its turn to 
the West and capitalism, Mozambique had become a donor darling. The donors rebelled in 1995; 
the IMF was forced to lift the cap on aid and the World Bank again regained dominance over 
economic policy in Mozambique. But the Bank and Fund agreed that Mozambique was too poor to 
afford universal primary education or increased health coverage, and this was not reversed until 
the introduction of the Millennium Development Goals. 
 This was the era of “savage capitalism” with the state forced to withdraw from the economy. 
There was widespread privatisation – small firms to members of the Frelimo elite and larger firms 
to foreign companies – and rapidly growing corruption. Joaquim Chissano nearly lost the 1999 
election4 and Frelimo was shocked to find that the vote against Chissano was largely due to 
complaints about corruption and what was seen by the voters as the lack of Frelimo commitment to 
undertake anti-corruption measures. Two major privatised banks were looted, and two people 
investigating the frauds were assassinated; President Chissano’s son was eventually charged with 
involvement in one of the murders.5 Meanwhile, although loosening the IMF cap led to economic 
growth in 1996-8, the economy declined again in 1999-2001 and poverty increased, raising 
questions about Washington Consensus economic policies. Taken together, these brought the era 
of donor-promoted freebooting capitalism to an end. 
 PRODUCTIVE ELITE CAPITALISM (2002- ): Under the constitution, Chissano could stand one 
more time for the presidency, but Frelimo realised that his image was so tarnished that he would 
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lose. So the party selected Armando Guebuza as its new leader, and he won the 2004 election 
with 64% of the vote. (A mark of Frelimo’s unity is that Chissano remained inside the party and is 
still an important political force.) Even as it fell out of fashion elsewhere, donors in Mozambique 
retained their commitment to the neo-liberal, Washington Consensus policies. But very quietly (so 
as not to frighten the horses) the Mozambican elite began to direct state resources into productive 
investment. Guebuza strengthened, broadened and decentralised the party, while retaining quite 
tight central control. And a serious crackdown on some corruption began. 
 The implications of this current period are the subject of the rest of this paper. 
 
Capitalism and corruption 
 
The late 1970s had been an era of exceptional integrity6; the leadership under Samora Machel 
was quite puritanical and any corruption was harshly punished, while the enthusiasm for 
independence and building a new country created a collaborative spirit that militated against 
private enrichment. 7  
 Michel Moran8 argues that authoritarian states tend to limit criminal activity through 
excessive regulation which limits the opportunities for corruption. Also corruption, misuse of s
property, and commerce outside the tight state regulations was treated politically as action
against the state. As the war intensified, Frelimo tied to curb unregulated trading through 
increasingly authoritarian methods, culminating
tate 
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1983 for running a prawn smuggling network. 
 But the worsening war made control impossible. Attempts to maintain fixed prices failed 
and there was increasing illegal trading in rural areas. State farms even bought food on the pa
market to
fi . 
 The harsh IMF adjustment programme of 1991 pushed down civil service wages and by 
1993 even nurses and teachers had fallen below the poverty line. Everyone needed extra money,
so civil servants stole time (to tend gardens or do second jobs) or resources (using state cars as 
taxis). Teachers, nurses and others in contact with the public expected informal fees. In just a few 
years of adjustment, petty corruption became institutionalised. People remembered the late 197
when no one asked for a bribe, and wer
knew the nurse had to feed her family. 
 The increase in corruption came with war and a shift to a new form of capitalism. Although 
Mozambique was closely aligned to the socialist bloc and Frelimo professed to be a socialist 
its image of socialism was really more like Nordic social democracy. The state was to play a 
leading role in the economy and in development, and trade was regulated, but there was to be a
large private sector and foreign investment. Indeed, in 1979 Frelimo began a programme of re-
privatisation of small and medium sized businesses that had been abandoned by the Portug
and were being run by the state. Th
business in rural areas and towns. 
 Frelimo leaders had little business or management experience but they learned fast. Some
of the new state companies proved to be well run. In the late 1980s, during the war, privatisati
was resumed. Some companies went to existing successful managers. Generals were given 
companies to tempt them out of the army. Some firms went to the Frelimo elite. And larger firms 
were generally taken over by foreign companies.  
 Privatisation was both pushed and backed by the donors and World Bank and IMF, who 
were soon hailing the privatisation of more than 1000 businesses as a world success. In order to 
promote this success, donors colluded in a highly non-transparent privatisation process. Indeed, 
the World Bank admitted that it pressed local banks to on-lend World Bank money to members 
the elite with newly privatised businesses, even knowing the loans would not be repaid. Some
donors also allowed the aid 
expectation of repayment.9 
 For the former “socialist” Frelimo elite it was a strange lesson in capitalism – people were 
given businesses and then given loans they did not need to repay. Indeed, many accepted the old 
communist cartoon image of the capitalist, as someone who does no work but has a big office a
fancy car an
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 Finally, the formal transition to multi-party democracy in 1994 was not accompanied by 
other mechanisms normal in democracies. There were no conflict of interest regulation, no asset 
reporting and other transparency requirements, and no reforms to the justice system. Thus the elite 
came to understand that “democracy” and ”capitalism” meant that they were allowed to use their 
privileged positions to accumulate wealth unobserved. 
 In an earlier article10, one of us argued that donors actually promoted corruption in 
Mozambique. They were so anxious to promote Mozambique as a free-market aid success, that 
they entered into a tacit agreement with the elite that corruption would be permitted so long as 
“market-friendly” policies and all other donor demands were accepted and publicly praised. The 
crunch came when the IMF and World Bank forced11 the privatisation of two state banks in 1995 
and 1996. In both cases honest central bank officials warned the Bretton Woods institutions that 
the only potential buyers were corrupt, but the reply was that even a corrupt privatisation was 
better than state ownership. Both banks were privatised to consortia containing members of the 
Frelimo elite, and the two banks failed after being looted of more than $400 million (often in the 
form of loans which were not repaid). As already noted, two prominent people investigating the 
frauds were assassinated. 
 The 1990s was also a period of land grabs. Land is owned by the state but those who use 
the land have permanent occupancy rights, in a compromise system intended to encourage 
investment but to prohibit land mortgages and landlessness. The World Bank and United States 
were pushing hard for land privatisation, and the elite allocated themselves vast tracts of 
productive land which they hoped to sell off after privatisation. But fear of landlessness led to 
pressure within Frelimo, and the land law was not changed.  
 This was an era of what was known as “goatism” (cabritismo), from the saying “a goat eats 
where it is tied”. In other words, people wanted a share of whatever passed within their reach. No 
project could go ahead without local and national party officials having shares; this was purely to 
earn a share of the profits, as these silent partners contributed nothing. It became so bad that 
many projects could not go ahead because the share for the goats made them unprofitable. David 
Stasavage12 notes that this was encouraged by a civil service organisation in which bureaucrats 
maintained extensive power and discretion over economic processes. Increasingly in the smaller 
neo-liberal state, bureaucrats only had power to block economic development and had few 
resources to assist, so they became increasingly rent seeking. 
 Many of the Frelimo elite adopted “greed is good” as their motto, and were supported in this 
by representatives from donors and the international financial institutions who assured them that by 
becoming personally rich, they would actually promote development. As recently as 2006, the IMF 
actually used the phase “trickle down” in a Mozambique document.13 
 This picture of goatism and rapacious capitalism is not the only one, and Frelimo was 
always divided. In an earlier paper14 one of us argued that the Frelimo elite was divided into 
“predatory” and “developmental” groups. The former looked to personal gain, assumed everything 
including the legal system was for sale, and expected the party to protect them; development was 
to be left to the donors and foreign investors. The latter group, while still accepting capitalism and 
wanting to live well, also looked to entrepreneurial activities that would promote Mozambican 
development, and continued with a traditional Frelimo ideology of wanting to “develop” 
Mozambique. Frelimo’s (perhaps justified) obsession with unity meant that even the most grossly 
corrupt had to be kept within the party and there could be no investigations, even of the looting of 
the privatised banks. 
 But there was a backlash inside the party. Armando Guebuza was backed by the 
developmental and traditional wings of the party in opposition to Chissano. A former interior and 
transport minister and political commissar of the army, he was one of the Frelimo leaders who 
actually understood Marxism, and thus also understood the significance of the shift to modern 
capitalism. He began to use his links in transport and government to become involved in real 
businesses, including fishing (which requires government licences) and port management. By the 
time of his selection as head of the party and presidential candidate, he was believed to be one of 
the richest people in Mozambique. 
 LSE anthropologist Jason Sumich points to the Frelimo ideology and narrative of 
modernisation.15 Portuguese fascism intentionally kept Mozambican and Portuguese peasants 
illiterate and poor; the revolutionaries came from a tiny elite who had been able to obtain at least a 
minimal education, and they saw one role of the revolution as modernising Mozambique and 
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pulling it into the 20th century. In 1979 President Samora Machel launched a plan to “overcome 
underdevelopment” in a decade. Thirty years later, President Amando Guebuza is calling for 
“victory over absolute poverty”. Machel’s model involved rapid industrialisation, including a textile 
factory in each of the 10 provinces. Today there is much more stress on electrification, computers 
and mobile telephones. Sumach points to the way the elite sees itself with a mission to modernise 
the poor. But that is a double edged sword. On one side, it is paternalistic and treats peasants as 
backward, which justifies the position of the elite (and its children) as leaders. The modernisation 
narrative means that the elite and their children often have more links with the modern western 
world, through television, internet and travel, than they do with Mozambique’s rural areas. On the 
other side, it has led to a huge expansion of education and ensured that development is more than 
an electoral slogan.  
 A final comment is necessary on the way that the elite links to Africa and Mozambique. 
Mozambique’s elite remains very nationalist. There is little evidence of large foreign bank accounts, 
palaces abroad, or hiring airplanes for foreign shopping trips. To be sure, there are modest flats in 
South Africa or Portugal. But the new rich tend to invest in Mozambique – million dollar houses in 
the capital Maputo, beach-front weekend properties and expensive cars. And, perhaps most 
important, they invest in their children, sending them to the best private schools in Maputo and 
then to good universities abroad. And the young tend to return to take up jobs in non-government 
organisations, government, or business – which also has the effect of perpetuating the elite 
dominance. However, the elite is not closed. The post-independence expansion of health and 
education created a new middle class of teachers and nurses who, themselves, had not been to 
university but were able to send their children to Mozambican universities. And talented and 
educated young people from middle class families can rise in the party, state, NGOs and business 
and some are absorbed into what is still an expanding elite. This does, however, create a potential 
political issue within the Frelimo party, in particular. Chissano and Guebuza were born in 1939 and 
1943 respectively and were leaders in the liberation war; the next group is the children of those 
liberation leaders or those who were in secondary school at independence. Younger people 
increasingly feel they are better educated and more capable than their elders (reflecting the 
modernisation narrative) but have no voice. 
 
Elite capital in the 21st century 
 
The election of Armando Guebuza as head of Frelimo in June 2002, in place of Joaquim Chissano, 
showed that the excesses of the 1990s were no longer acceptable. It also marked an important 
change of attitude and approach to the party, government, and especially to development strategy. 
 Guebuza spent substantial time rebuilding the Frelimo party at provincial and local level 
and later decentralising government administration; party and state were brought closer together 
and there was increasing pressure for state functionaries to join the party. Local development 
committees and local officials for the first time had real power over spending local budgets, while at 
the same time Guebuza and Frelimo centralised control over major decisions. The revitalised party 
became an important channel of two way communication, information passing up from the bottom 
made Frelimo much more responsive to grass roots concerns, but instructions passing from top to 
bottom increased central control. Although personal patronage was still dispensed by party barons 
and the old guard, it was increasingly the party rather than individuals who controlled patronage.  
 From the base, the message was about the lack of jobs and money. Meanwhile the 
manifest failure of the Washington Consensus development model still being promoted led some 
officials to, for the first time, brazenly ignore the donors. In one unprecedented move, without 
consulting the donors, the new Guebuza government inserted a budget line to give $250,000 a 
year to each of 128 districts for local development and job creation, with decisions at district level. 
In 1995 at the height of the neo-liberal mania the World Bank had destroyed the local cashew 
industry by enforcing free export of unprocessed nuts.16 From 2001 a government agency for 
cashew worked with local institutions to reverse the World Bank imposed policy and support the 
entire value chain, with support for new processing factories and restrictions on exporting 
unprocessed nuts. By 2006, 6000 factory jobs had been created. But the whole process was done 
quietly, with little publicity, so as to avoid a negative response from the World Bank and donors.17 
 In the 1990s, the nomenklatura used their state links for acquiring land (often left unused) 
and explicit rent-seeking through loans which were not repaid, commissions, and interests in 
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foreign investments designed purely to receive a share of profits. We argue here that there may be 
a shift to creating what appear to be well run businesses, using state access to gain contracts and 
licences, but increasingly actually carrying out the work and doing it well.  
 The transition to a new style of elite capitalism is neither smooth nor even. Guebuza is 
aggressively expanding businesses in which he a personal interest. But he is also attracting the 
brightest of the foreign trained younger generation who work hard and want to move quickly, while 
marginalising the old comrades who are only trying to get rich through “goatism” and influence, 
using their family and party links. But gangster capitalism, “goatism” and petty corruption did not 
end suddenly or completely, and remain present. Key members of the elite have built on bases 
created in the 1990s and expanded their interests under the party and state umbrella18: 
 GUEBUZA FAMILY COMPANIES: The main company partly owned by the President is INTELEC, 
which is involved in electricity transmission and equipment, telecommunications, gas, consulting, 
cement, tourism, construction, Tata vehicles, and fishing. The company is headed by Salimo Amad 
Abdula, who is also head of the Mozambican business association,19 which gives President 
Guebuza a direct role in all Mozambican business. Intelec also holds 5% of Vodacom 
Moçambique, the private mobile telephone company which competes with the state operator and 
Abdula recently became chair of the board of Vodacom Moçambique.20 Cornelder de Mocambique 
which has the port management contracts for Beira and Quelimane is partly owned Guebuza (the 
majority is owned by Cornelder in the Netherlands and CFM, the state railway company). 
 Guebuza children and relatives have interests in various companies, often in participation 
with other children of the elite, and are involved in telecommunications, mining, construction, 
tourism, environmental issues, petrol stations, and a new grain terminal; several consultancy 
companies have also been established. Armando Guebuza is also a shareholder of some of them, 
particularly through the family company Focus 21. 
 Guebuza family companies have a number of projects around natural gas from a large field 
on the coast at Inhambane. Intelec had a gas fired power station supplying electricity to Vilankulo, 
the nearest city to the gas field. It is part of a group (linked to the French company Suez) building a 
second power station along the existing pipeline in Moamba, in part to sell electricity to South 
Africa. A company owned by another member of the family has the contract to convert and sell 
natural gas as motor fuel. 
 Two other traditional Frelimo leaders have important business interests. GRAÇA MACHEL, 
former education minister, widow of Samora Machel and wife of Nelson Mandela remains a key 
figure in the developmental wing of the party. Her Community Development Foundation21 and her 
group Whatana have made a range of development-linked investments, and have links with 
Petromoc, the state petroleum company. Whatana also holds 5% of Vodacom Moçambique and is 
proposing to purchase an interest in a large Mozambican bank. 
 And former president JOAQUIM CHISSANO is building his business interests through the 
Fundação Joaquim Chissano and TIKO Investimentos, partly with $5 million from the Mo Ibrahim 
Prize for African Leadership which he won in 2007. In contrast to Guebuza and Machel, Chissano 
is involved in grander projects which are reliant much more on external money and expertise. TIKO 
in late 2008 bought a small troubled airline, Transairways. And the foundation is involved in an $8 
billion oil refinery in Maputo, jointly with Petromoc, but in early 2009 it became clear that money 
could not be found for the project.22 Chissano has also failed to attract the younger and more 
competent generation to his businesses, which are increasingly accused of being poorly run.23 The 
most visible face of his enterprises is former foreign minister Leonardo Simão, who is head of the 
foundation, but whose own company, Golden Rose Fields, was temporarily closed down in 2007 
by government inspectors because of very poor conditions for its workers.24 
 The Brazilian Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (now just Vale) was awarded a mining licence for 
one of the largest untapped coking coal reserves in the world, in Tete province in December 2004, just 
before Chissano left office; Chissano in 2005 became a non-executive director of African Rainbow 
Minerals, a South African black empowerment company owned by millionaire Patrice Motsepe, which 
subsequently signed a joint venture with Vale. Chissano was then guest of honour at the official 
opening of the project on 28 March 2009.25 
 Finally, playing a less activist role are a number of state and party companies. SPI is the 
investment company of the Frelimo party, while SPF serves as an investment company for veterans of 
the liberation war. SPI seems caught in the old rent-seeking days, which was illustrated in 2006 when a 
company part-owned by SPI was given the contract to install a non-invasive scanner in port of Maputo; 
Hanlon-Mosse: Is Mozambique’s elite moving from corruption to development? - 6 
all containers going through the port had to pass through the scanner, and pay a fee of $20 to $100 per 
container.26 
 
Returning to an old development model? 
 
The leader of a different development model is not a hang-over from the 1990s, but a new group of 
companies, INSITEC, created by Guebuza protégé Celso Correia. He is a prime example of the way 
dynamism and elite links have mixed. At independence, the Cahora Bassa dam, one of the largest in 
Africa, remained in Portuguese ownership27. Thirty years after independence, Guebuza wanted to take 
the dam into national ownership, while Portugal wanted to sell because it urgently needed money to 
reduce its budget deficit to meet European Union rules, but the IMF would not allow Mozambique to 
take on additional debt. Correia was a good friend of the son-in-law of a good friend of Guebuza, and 
Correia used his links to arrange a meeting with Guebuza. He then did the financial engineering that 
allowed the debt to rest with banks and the dam company itself. His success in organising the take-over 
of Cahora Bassa has propelled him into the centre of the network of companies around Guebuza. 
 In 2007, as part of the Cahora Bassa deal, Insitec was allowed to take over the 18% local 
share of the second-largest bank, BCI-Fomento, and Correia became president of the bank; the 
rest is owned by Portuguese banks Caixa Geral de Depósitos (51%) and BPI (30%).28 Corrreia 
has quickly moved BCI into actively carrying out the government’s development strategy. A 
repeated and bitter complaint is that the privatised banking system concentrated in the big cities 
and closed branch banks in market towns and refused to reopen them despite political pressu
Under Correia, BCI has expanded to 50 branches and has won high praise from the governor of 
the Bank of Mozambique, Ernesto Gove. Similarly, when a US company abandoned its interest in 
managing the northern railways in 2008, it was Insitec and BCI that took over th
re. 
e shares. 
 There are four companies in the group, Intéllica and I-Tec which specialise in computers 
and information technology, Insitec-Constroi in construction, and Energia Capital dealing with the 
energy sector and bio-fuels.  
 Insistec is young. Correia is 31 years old, and the average age of his partners is 30; he 
argues that young people are more dynamic and entrepreneurial.29 Correia said that an Insitec 
policy is to form links with bigger foreign companies in order to raise Insitec’s performance. In 2006 
Insistec took over the consulting arm of Ernst & Young in Mozambique. Insitec-Constroi has linked 
up with foreign construction companies to improve quality and speed; it successfully built a new 
building for the National Communications Institute (INCM) in partnership with Segecoa Moç, a 
Chinese construction company based in Mozambique. 
 Insitec supplied the computers for Mozambique’s electoral registration in 2007 and for the 
electoral process in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  
 Energia Capital is partly owned by two parastatal companies with important party links: 
GPZ, the Zambezi river valley development office, and SOGIR, an investment company itself 
owned by GPZ and various other state companies in telecommunication, electricity and insurance. 
Energia Capital and a Brazilian company Camargo Corrêa have been given the right to build the 
$3.2 bn Mphanda Nkuwa dam on the Zambezi river and a 1400 km power line to link it to Maputo; 
a project now delayed by the global depression. 
 Insitec gives its vision as: “To achieve an international presence and recognition as a 
company which is fundamental for the development of southern Africa.”30 Insistec already works in 
Angola, DRC and South Africa. In December 2008 BCI said it wanted to become a regional bank, 
and is negotiating to take over part of a South African bank. 
 This shift from unproductive to productive rent-seeking begins to look more like the model 
in some successful developing countries. Japan, Korea, Taiwan31, Singapore, and Malaysia all 
promoted industrialisation, typically through a combination of subsidy and protection which allowed 
privileged local private firms and groups to grow to a size at which they could be competitive. In 
East Asia, private companies were selected as “national champions” and supported and built up by 
government.32 This was combined with policies which forced local firms to become more efficient, 
innovative and competitive, and penalised those which were lazy or ineffective and simply survived 
on the protection.  
 A similar model was followed in Latin America, notably in Brazil and Mexico in the 1940s-
60s. Mexico is an important example for Mozambique, because Mexico was a predominant party 
state in which the party maintained support by promoting development using agricultural33 and 
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mineral revenues, as Frelimo hopes to do in Mozambique,34 and because of its revolutionary 
history Mexico had the same family links between the private sector and state.35 In both Brazil and 
Mexico key elements were: 1) cheap, directed finance from the development bank – Nafinsa in 
Mexico and BNDE in Brazil; 2) state companies and state investment in private companies; 3) 
subsidised services and inputs; 4) protection of production for domestic markets; 5) preference in 
state contracts; and 6) export incentives of up to 20%. Although the programmes were successful, 
Richard M Auty argues that for two reasons policies were less successful than in Korea. First, 
Korea moved steadily though labour-intensive to capital-intensive manufacturing, while Brazil and 
Mexico tried to leap over the labour-intensive stage, which depressed the rate of employment 
creation. Second, Mexico protected a rent-seeking elite (amiguismo – “friendism” – was the 
Mexican equivalent to cabritismo – “goatism”) and failed to push firms to be competitive and 
innovative.36 
 Closer to home, in South Africa in the 1940s, Afrikaner industrialisation was built on state 
and public support for a small group of financial institutions, led by Sanlam, which in turn financed 
the development of manufacturing.37 The core argument behind the policies in all of these 
countries is that, in contrast to the neo-liberal view, state intervention is essential because 
transnational capital is predatory and will try to block local development, because domestic 
entrepreneurs are weak and lack the necessary capital (as well as being risk averse), and because 
it can take a decade to gain profitability which is too long for companies acting on their own. 
 Indeed, as an alternative to the World Bank-IMF Washington Consensus, Keun Lee, John 
Mathews, and Robert Wade propose the BeST (Beijing-Seoul-Tokyo) Consensus38. They write: 
The BeST Consensus starts with the proposition that palliative policies, focused on 
poverty reduction (as in the Millennium Development Goals), must not be confused 
with development policies. Development policies take as their touchstone building 
capacities of (local or joint venture) firms. … 
 But the BeST Consensus does not endorse a simple import-substituting 
industrialisation strategy. It enjoins a combination of (a) assistance to exporters 
(including duty-free access to inputs and public provision of information about export 
markets), and also (b) temporary assistance to selected import-substituting 
production, in conditions of enough openness to ensure that most domestic firms 
are subject to close to world market prices (adjusted for transport costs) in most of 
their operations. Externally set prices put pressure on firms and the political 
leadership to be economically efficient. When state intervention weakens market 
incentives the state has to supplement market discipline with alternative disciplining 
mechanisms, such as sunset clauses on industry assistance. The East Asian 
economies provide abundant evidence on how to do what mainstream economists 
say is impossible - promote exports and import-substitution at the same time. … 
 To encourage local or JV firms to grow and reinvest, states following the 
BeST Consensus assure them of preferential access to certain sectors and learning 
opportunities. The choice of which sectors to target is made easier in late-
developers as compared to already developed countries, because they are much 
further back from the world frontier. 
 Is this what is happening now in Mozambique? President Armando Guebuza appears to be 
building up a group of companies around information technology and built on bright, young, well-
educated, and, most importantly, competent, Mozambicans. 
 Raphie Kaplinsky and Ha-Joon Chang39 both point to the problem of global political 
pressures against industrial policies designed to promote this kind of development. Governments 
are no longer permitted to provide the range of subsidies and other forms of support which 
facilitated industrial growth in previous eras. 
 In particular, then, the kinds of policies which promoted industrialisation in other developing 
countries – preferential access to government tenders, subsidies, and direct interaction with 
government policy makers – are now seen as improper and corrupt.  
 That brings us to two opposing descriptions of the Mozambican firms and groups 
developing around the present and past presidents. The most common picture, painted by the 
donors and the international financial agencies, is of a corrupt elite using its access to state 
resources for personal gain, blocking access to more efficient foreign firms and extracting rents 
from the higher prices that can be charged for goods and services. 
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 But we can paint another picture. Given Mozambique’s history and social context, it is 
logical that enterprises which can be “national champions” will develop around powerful people, 
such as the present and past presidents. Changing international rules and attitudes, which are now 
biased toward transnational corporations and against local capital, mean that the methods used to 
support “national champions” in Asia, Latin America and South Africa are no longer acceptable. 
But what is now being treated as corrupt and as poor governance is, in fact, a sensible latecomer 
development strategy, and is merely doing what other developing countries showed was necessary 
to build a few regionally and globally competitive companies.  
 Insitec has clearly benefitted from some less than transparent decisions by the government, 
for example over the Mpanda Nkuwa dam and power line. Similarly, without tender, Insitec was 
given three key sites in central Maputo, including a Ministry of Labour car park, for buildings it 
plans to construct.40 The independent weekly Savana41 reported that Correia and Insitec had come 
under pressure to give some Frelimo “goats” an interest in the company; Correia replied that he did 
not need that kind of “political muscle”. But he added that “big business is normally aligned with the 
grand national political strategies of the country.” This happened in the past in the now developed 
countries and must happen in Mozambique, where the private sector is very young, he said. 
 The question is whether the development of presidential companies should be more openly 
encouraged as a way of creating firms and groups which are dynamic and effective enough to be 
competitive and developmental. Can these presidential companies, through their privileged access 
to the state, potentially grow to a critical mass allowing them to become major players in the 
development of Mozambique and southern Africa, as happened in the past with privileged 
companies in the Asian Tigers, Latin America and South Africa? 
 
Conditions, competition, collaboration, innovation 
 
Having large groups with political and state connections seems to be a necessary condition for 
development – but it is not sufficient. Research on successful developing countries suggests there 
are four other requirements: 
 CONDITIONS: In South Korea and other Asian Tigers, access to credit and state resources 
was highly conditional; companies had to meet rigid conditions for sales and exports, to ensure 
that state resources were not wasted. So far, access to state rents in Mozambique is unconditional. 
Mexico provides a worrying example, where family and party links allowed high levels of 
unproductive rent-seeking. 
 COMPETITION: Unquestionably, national companies need protection and support in the initial 
phase, but to be useful they must eventually be at least regionally competitive. Thus there needs to 
be a system which ensures that firms are steadily opened to competition. Writing on the BeST 
Consensus, Lee, Matthews and Wade say there must be “enough openness to ensure that most 
domestic firms are subject to close to world market prices (adjusted for transport costs) in most of 
their operations. Externally set prices put pressure on firms and the political leadership to be 
economically efficient.” This is a real problem in Mozambique, where, for example, protection of 
local construction companies has led to low quality and high cost. But Insitec is explicitly moving to 
be regionally competitive. 
 COLLABORATION: Building national capacity requires collaboration, even between 
competing companies, in marketing, research and development, and other areas. For example, a 
group of privately owned cashew factories now export jointly under a single name, Zambique. In 
Brazil, the state development bank has a programme to bring together entrepreneurs in the same 
sector to foster collaboration and exchange of information and experience. Such collaborative 
groups are also better able to push the state for support, and such structured collaboration is 
needed in Mozambique. A concern for Mozambique is the importance of personal links with 
President Guebuza, and good people have been politically and economically marginalised 
because they fell out with Guebuza. The intense competition between Guebuza and Chissano is 
personal, political and economic, and a number of Chissano allies have been marginalised42. Also, 
in order to give the bank BCI to Celso Correira, Guebuza had to push former finance minister 
Magid Osman and his Mozambican company SCI out of the bank; Osman resisted and the chance 
to build collaborative links was lost. Interestingly, however, the marginalised people do not leave 
Frelimo.43 
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 INNOVATION: National companies can only be regionally and internationally competitive if 
they develop the ability to innovate, creating new products and improved production techniques. 
This requires collaboration and state support. Lee, Matthews and Wade note that “in tackling the 
task of building the capacities of firms, public agencies can help compensate for deficiencies in the 
existing structure of markets - agencies such as export-import banks, export processing zone 
administrations, development banks, technology institutes, and high-level state coordinating 
agencies (such as MITI and Ministry of Finance in Japan, the Industrial Development Bureau and 
the Industrial Technology Research Institute in Taiwan, and the National Development Reform 
Commission and the Export-Import Bank in China). Staffing up such agencies with technically 
competent people is a high priority in countries following the BeST Consensus.” This has been 
difficult in Mozambique, because donors have been strongly and publicly opposed to a 
development bank and other support agencies, so government support has been done with little 
publicity and even clandestinely, as has been the case with cashew. It is easiest to start innovating 
around local problems and this is already taking place in the cashew sector; the Guebuza 
companies are heavily involved in developing uses of natural gas. Guebuza created a new Ministry 
of Science and Technology with a young, dynamic minister, but it so far is not providing R&D or 
other support for local companies. John Matthews44 argues that biofuels “represent an exceedingly 
attractive option for developing countries”, in part because the crop mix and growing conditions are 
different in each country, and thus fuel extraction requires technological modifications which are 
ideal for local technicians to gain their initial skills. Mozambique is putting great emphasis on 
biofuels, yet it is totally dependent on foreign companies for the technology, which means an 
opportunity to learn innovation skills is being lost. 
 We argue here that such support is an essential part of any latecomer development 
strategy, and that presidential companies represent an important and necessary first step. But the 
road is still long, and discipline will be required. Can the Mozambican elite develop the culture of 
hard work, saving, and delayed consumption that was central to the economic development of the 
Asian tigers? 
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